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BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

TESTIMONY OF PAWEL MONAT

JUNE 13, 1960

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SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND

Monday, June 13, 1960

United States Senate,  
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration  
of the Internal Security Act and Other  
Internal Security Laws, of  
the Committee on the Judiciary,  
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice at 2:00 o'clock  
p.m., in Room 2241, New Senate Office Building, Washington,  
D. C., Senator James O. Eastland, presiding.

Present: Senator Eastland.

Also Present: J. G. Sourwine, Chief Counsel; Benjamin  
Mandel, Director of Research, and Frank Schroeder, Chief  
Investigator.

Senator Eastland. Will you stand up and be sworn?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about  
to give the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and  
nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Monat. I do.

Senator Eastland. You proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

TESTIMONY OF PAWEL MONAT

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel Monat, would you please identify yourself and give the subcommittee a little information about yourself?

Mr. Monat. Yes, sir; my name is Pawel Monat, I was born on January 24, 1921 in Stanislawow, Poland. This town is now known as Stanislav and is part of the Soviet Union. My father was a farm overseer on a large estate. After attending elementary school and completing my Gymnasium studies in 1940, I attended medical school at the University of Lvov but dropped out after a few months for financial reasons. After the Soviet Army had moved into Eastern Poland, I was drafted into the Soviet Army and attended the Soviet artillery officer candidate school at Sumy in the Kharkov area. In March 1942 I was graduated with the rank of Lieutenant in the Soviet Army, and served in the Crimea, Stalingrad and Chkalov. In August 1943 I transferred to the Polish Army of General Berling and as an artillery battery commander of the First Heavy Artillery Brigade in the Polish Army First Corps, I fought from Smolensk to within 50 miles of Berlin. I was promoted to captain in 1945.

After the war, I continued my career in the Polish Army, serving successively as a chief of reconnaissance of an artillery brigade, chief of staff of an artillery division, and finally, commander of an artillery division. Then from

November 1947 to February 1950 I studied at the Polish General Staff Academy in Warsaw. In early 1950 I was selected along with about ten other field grade officers and five or ten civilians to be assigned to Polish Military Intelligence, or O-11, as it was called at that time. I had been promoted to major back in 1946 or 1947.

My career in O-II continued from February 1950 up until I decided to leave Poland in June 1959. Of my nine years in Military Intelligence, I spent about six years abroad: From June 1952 to August 1955, I served as Polish Military Attache in Peiping and was accredited to both Communist China and North Korea. Then from September 1955 to May 1958 I was stationed here in Washington as the Polish Army, Navy and Air Attache. My assignments to O-II Headquarters in Warsaw included the positions of Deputy Chief and later chief of the American Section of O-II Reports Branch, Chief of the Military Foreign Affairs Branch, and finally, Chief of the Military Attache Branch. I was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1951 and then full colonel in 1952.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, since you apparently were in the midst of a successful career in Poland -- I note you were only 31 years old when you were promoted to full colonel -- why did you decide to leave and seek asylum in the United States? Were you in any kind of trouble after returning to Poland from your assignment as attache in Washington?

Mr. Monat. No, sir, not in any way. On the contrary, my superiors were pleased with my work and had no doubts about my reliability. I started to doubt the Communist system during my assignment in North Korea during the Korean War. Then, reading the secret speech of Khrushchev to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, I found many terrible facts about communism which shattered my faith in it. The Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising served to increase my doubts. But with the October revolution in Poland and the appearance that Communism might become more human, I again started to take hope. Upon returning to Poland in 1958, I found that all my hopes were not being realized and, what's more, the last glimmers of freedom brought by the so-called Polish October were being extinguished. I felt I had to sacrifice my promising career in the service for ideological reasons and start a new, uprooted life. Therefore, when the opportunity arose, I left Poland with my wife and son and asked for asylum in the United States.

Mr. Sourwine. We are sure you will not regret your decision, Colonel. As you know, we are primarily interested in hearing your testimony about the activities and methods of operation of Polish Military Intelligence insofar as they affect the interests of the United States. What is the mission of O-II Colonel?

Mr. Monat. When O-II was first established in 1944 as the Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Army, it had as its original mission the collection of tactical intelligence behind the lines of the German Army for the Polish and Soviet Armies. At the end of the war, the mission was changed to include the collection of military information from overt and semi-overt sources, the establishment in Western countries of long-term, clandestine sources of positive information, and the dispatch of agents from Poland on short observation and collection trips.

Mr. Sourwine. What is the actual size of Polish Military Intelligence, Colonel?

Mr. Monat. O-II or Z-II as it has been called since January 1953, actually has about 500 staff members assigned to it. Of these about 80 or 90 are assigned abroad as Military Attache personnel. Most of the remainder work in Z-II Headquarters in Warsaw, in the various components of the organization. Among these are the Operational Branch, which actually is responsible for the conduct of operations to collect foreign intelligence; the Reports Branch, a technical support branch; a codes and cipher branch; a communications unit; and the usual administrative and support branches. In addition, there are about 1200 other personnel who are under the operational and administrative control of Z-II in attached units like the Special Parachute/Sabotage Battalion,

The Radio Battalion, and Unit 2000. The total, therefore, runs to about 1700 people.

Mr. Sourwine, Colonel, to what extent is the United States a priority target for Z-II

Mr. Monat. The collection of Military information about U. S. forces is one of the highest priorities Z-II has. Z-II operates against the United States not only from the office of the Military Attache in Washington, but also in every country in which there are U. S. troops or installations. For example, part of the mission of the Z-II representatives assigned to Great Britain is to collect military information concerning U. S. Air Force bases, guided missile bases, munition stockpiles, atomic and conventional installations, and U. S. AAA installations on British soil. Similarly, Z-II has a special mission to collect information about all NATO forces throughout the world. There is even a special section in the Reports Branch which is responsible for evaluating, collecting, and disseminating all intelligence about NATO forces wherever they might be stationed.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, by what means is Z-II able to collect information?

Mr. Monat. Z-II collects information from recruited agents, witting and unwitting informants, overt and semi-overt publications, and reconnaissance by Z-II personnel stationed abroad.

Mr. Sourwine. How does Z-II recruit its agents?

Mr. Monat. In several ways. Some agents of course, are Polish nationals who travel abroad either as tourists, government representatives, or as merchant seamen. Some agents are recruited within their own country by members of the Polish MA's office assigned to that country. These people are carefully cultivated before recruitment and eventually asked to supply information about their own military forces, those of a neighboring country, or on NATO forces stationed nearby. In carrying out its mission against Western forces, Z-II also attempts to recruit civilian and military visitors to Poland.

Mr. Sourwine. Please tell us a little about how this is done.

Mr. Monat. In order to develop leads for the recruitment of visitors to Poland, the official diplomatic representatives responsible for issuing visas prepare lists of all visa applicants and makes these lists available to the Z-II representative there. That would be either the MA or another Z-II officer assigned to the prospective visitor's country.

The lists are forwarded to Z-II headquarters in Warsaw where appropriate action is taken for possible recruitment. In order to ascertain information concerning the background of the visitor, Z-II initiates the necessary action with the UB (Polish Security Police) to place mail coverage on the visitor's relatives residing in Poland. The information received from the mail coverage is then furnished to the Z-II staff officer who is responsible for the conduct of the operation. Any Z-II attempt to use information pertaining to foreign visitors in Poland is coordinated with the UB in order to preclude a duplicate recruitment attempt by both of these organizations. The method of cultivating and approaching visitors varies in each case. Z-II may not necessarily approach a foreign visitor while he is still in Poland; rather Z-II might decide to wait until the visitor has returned to his own country. It is also possible that some of the persons recruited as a result of trips to Poland would assume the status of sleeper agents until such time as Z-II desires to activate them.

Mr. Sourwine. Does Z-II direct any agents against this country from any bases outside the United States?

Mr. Monat. Yes, sir. In June 1959 Z-II was seriously considering using the so-called third country technique in order to improve its intelligence collection activities in various parts of the world. The discussion centered primarily

on the utilization of this technique in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. These three countries will be considered as one area of operations for the purpose of utilizing agents developed in one country in operations directed against the other countries. For example, A Z-II Mexican agent would be utilized against the United States and Canada. During June 1959 a deputy chief of Z-II, visited the United States and Canada for the explicit purpose of observing and evaluating the existing conditions of these countries to determine the feasibility of implementing the third country operational technique. It is possible that this technique will be used in European countries as well as on the North American continent. Z-II is now contemplating the establishment of additional MA offices in Iran, Greece, Norway, Japan, and Argentina. A MA office in Argentina would act as a springboard for intelligence activities directed not only against Latin America but also against the United States.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, is it possible to make a comparison between the methods used by Z-II and those used by Soviet Intelligence?

Mr. Monat. The methods used by Z-II are similar to those of Soviet Military intelligence. This similarity, of course, is attributable to the direct control of Z-II by the Soviet between 1951 and 1956, and to the fact that Polish staff officers were given excellent training by the Soviets during

this same period.

Mr. Sourwine. To what extent would you say there is guidance and exploitation of Z-II by the Soviet Union?

Mr. Monat. From the inception of O-II in 1944, Soviet military intelligence has maintained either direct or indirect control of O-II activities. Between 1951 and 1957, the Soviets were in complete control of O-II. After the transfer of General Wacław KOMAR from chief of O-II to Quartermaster General in September 1951, a Soviet officer, Major General KASZNIKOW, was appointed acting chief of O-II. He had formerly served as an advisor to KOMAR. Until the beginning of 1950 there were only three Soviet advisors in O-II. At the time of KASZNIKOW's appointment as chief, two Soviet staff officers were assigned directly as O-II staff officers -- not just as advisors. The Soviets then adopted a policy of strengthening the O-II organization by the replacement of various military personnel in important positions and by the application of strict security regulations. In November 1951 about 15 Soviet staff officers from the RU (Soviet Intelligence Directorate) were assigned to O-II. Included among these officers was Colonel Aleksander SUCHACKI. These officers were highly qualified in military intelligence and wore Polish uniforms and assumed Polish military ranks. They were placed in every responsible position in the O-II organization. The Soviets improved upon the O-II organization and introduced

Soviet intelligence techniques into O-II operations. O-II was under the complete control of the RU. Polish officers assigned to O-II were used in minor positions and were advised to take advantage of the Soviets presence and learn from their superior training and experience in the military intelligence field. During this period the Soviets were in a position to take over any O-II agents they wanted. I assume these agents remained under Soviet control when Z-II reverted to Polish direction.

In January 1952, KASZNIKOW was recalled to Moscow and Colonel SUCHACKI became chief of O-II. During SUCHACKI's tenure as chief, he continued to guide O-II from a relatively ineffective intelligence organization to a highly efficient military intelligence agency, patterned after the Soviet military intelligence service. In 1953, SUCHACKI was replaced by a Colonel WIEDZMIEDZ, another Soviet officer.

Between 1955 and 1956 the majority of Soviet officers assigned to Z-II were recalled to the Soviet Union; only three or four Soviet officers remained, and they were then redesignated as advisors. Upon the removal of the Soviet officers, all positions of responsibility were filled by Polish professional military officers. In November and December 1956, all remaining Soviet advisors left Z-II. Since then Soviet control over Z-II has been indirect rather than direct. There is now only a Soviet Liaison Officer assigned to Z-II, Commander Igor

AMOSOW.

Mr. Sourwine. Excuse me, Colonel, but is this the same AMOSOW who was assigned to the Soviet Military Office in Washington, D. C., as Assistant Naval Attache and declared persona non grata by our Government in 1954?

Mr. Monat. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Are the Soviets now able to exert any influence on Z-II through him?

Mr. Monat. Yes, sir. After the departure of the Soviet officers and advisors, RU learned that it is still possible to exercise a more sophisticated and indirect control through the person of AMOSOW.

Mr. Sourwine. Please describe to us the mechanics of Soviet guidance and exploitation of Z-II as it exists today.

Mr. Monat. The method the Soviets use always varies from time to time, and is dependent on the relationship between the chief of Z-II and the RU. This relationship with the present chief of Z-II, General Grzegorz KORCZYNSKI, is not a good one so far as the Soviets are concerned. As a result, the RU exerts much of its influence through General Jerzy BORDZILOWSKI, the Polish Chief of Staff who still holds his Soviet citizenship. The Soviets are also assisted in maintaining their influence over Z-II by the presence within Z-II of many pro-Soviet Polish staff officers. Through AMOSOW and BORDZILOWSKI, the Soviets levy intelligence

requirements on Z-II. In addition, copies of all reports prepared by Z-II are furnished to the RU; information concerning all Z-II sources is also available to the RU. Although the Soviets do not designate specific areas of operational responsibility to Z-II or other satellite intelligence services, the Soviet services can force any of the Satellite services, including Z-II, to concentrate their operations on certain geographical areas merely by levying on the services intelligence requirements pertaining to those areas. The RU furnishes Z-II with a considerable amount of intelligence information, which is used primarily by the Reports Branch of Z-II. Information furnished by Z-II to the RU is evaluated by the Soviets, and results of the evaluation are made known to Z-II. I believe Z-II contributed quite a bit of information to the RU which the RU has officially reported as being of enormous value.

Mr. Sourwine. Do the RU and Z-II conduct any joint operations?

Mr. Monat. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel Monat, for what purpose does Z-II use the Military Attaches abroad?

Mr. Monat. The Operational Branch of Z-II uses the offices of MA's abroad, except those in the USSR, CSR, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, China, and North Korea as bases for directing the covert intelligence activities against all countries considered

as potential enemies in any future conflict involving Poland.

Mr. Sourwine. You stated before that Z-II does not use the Polish MA's stationed in countries of the Eastern Bloc to direct covert intelligence activities; by this do you mean the Z-II does not conduct operations at all against the USSR or other satellites?

Mr. Monat. Yes, sir, that is correct. The only Polish Military Attache to a Bloc country who conducts operations is assigned to the Polish MA's office in East Berlin. And his operations, as well as those of the Polish Military Attache in the Polish Military Mission in West Berlin, are directed against West Germany and the Allies in West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

Mr. Sourwine. What were your duties in behalf of Z-II while you were assigned as Military Attache to the United States?

Mr. Monat. As Attache in Washington my activities were like those of most Polish Attaches station in Western countries. The cultivation and recruitment of agents, of course, is one of an MA's primary responsibilities. In addition to the collection of overt periodicals, I and personnel of my office also collected information through reconnaissance and attendance at technical conventions and exhibits. Z-II Headquarters also levied on us the requirement to purchase technical material and electronic equipment in the United States.

Our reconnaissance trips were made to gain all information of an intelligence nature available concerning United States military installations. Polish Military Officials would attempt to drive around the perimeter of an installation making notes and sometimes taking photographs of the area. They frequently stop in the city nearest to the installation, where they usually would visit the Chamber of Commerce office, the American Automobile Association office, and often, local drug stores and book stores where they secured the available published items that concerned that particular installation and area. At an installation such as Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Polish Military Officials visit the museum there and obtain all pamphlets and publications available to the public.

When military maneuvers are being held, Polish Officials attempt to observe the maneuvers and then compare their

observations with the American press reports to determine if such reports are accurate and true.

As I indicated, it is the practice of Polish Military Officials to attend many of the various technical conventions held in cities throughout the United States. Officers gather all of the data available to the public at the particular convention and examine items on exhibit at the various booths. Reports of the observations, along with any technical material obtained, are furnished to the Polish Military Attache for transmittal to Warsaw in the diplomatic pouch.

Many trips performed by Military Attache personnel in the United States are performed for the purpose of buying technical publications and electronic equipment. About the first of each year the Military Attache receives a list of electronic tubes and other equipment needed by Polish intelligence. This list of items, prepared in Warsaw, is furnished to the officers assigned to the Military Attache's office and they are given assignments to purchase the needed items; in purchasing this equipment the Military Attache personnel usually do not identify themselves as being from the Military Attache's office. If an item is ordered for future delivery, the officer's last name and home address or the address of the Polish Embassy annex are all that are given the store of purchase. Similarly, Polish Military Attache personnel have ordered by mail United States Army

training manuals and subscriptions to military and technical periodicals without identifying their official connection with the Polish Government.

I was told that in 1954 the State Department sent a note to the Polish Embassy in Washington announcing that failure of official representatives of the Embassy to identify themselves as such in correspondence with American citizens or companies would be considered a violation of the accepted norms of diplomatic conduct.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, how valuable to Z-II are the overt and semi-overt sources available to Military Attache personnel in this country?

Mr. Monat. Extremely valuable. The United States is the only country in the world where an intelligence agent or staff officer can obtain so much information free or for the expenditure of a nominal sum of money. In other countries he would have to spend 90% of his time acquiring such material, and he would never reach the quantity or the quality of such material obtained so easily in the United States. For example, in late 1956 or early 1957 the Polish Military Attache's office purchased from the Government Printing Office in Washington, D. C., an 18 volume set of books written by the United States Army Engineers; these books contain complete information on all United States ports. If this information had been obtained piecemeal through an agent

operation, the Military Attache's office would have been willing to pay the agent about \$50,000. Z-II obtains more technical material and information in the United States than in all other countries in the world combined.

Mr. Sourwine. How successful, Colonel, have Z-II representatives in this country been in their efforts to recruit Americans as agents for Z-II?

Mr. Monat. Based on material I read in Warsaw, I have concluded that the Z-II representatives were relatively successful in the recruitment of agents for military intelligence, especially in late 1940's and early 1950's. I do know that during my tour here, Z-II did not have any agents being run out of the MA's office. The recruitment of agents for political and economic information is the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or UB as it is commonly called.

Mr. Sourwine. What specific efforts do you know of that have been made by Z-II to recruit agents here? What is their approach?

Mr. Monat. There are many different methods. For example, I remember one which required a lot of effort but was unsuccessful. During the fall of 1956 and early 1957, Z-II Headquarters decided to furnish the MA's office here with letters written by people in Poland to relatives in the United States. Z-II instructed the MA's office that these letters were to be personally delivered by Polish officials. Z-II's

plan was that in this manner, friendships with the relatives here could be developed with the aim of eventual recruitment of these people for Polish Intelligence. Most of the officials assigned to the MA's office during this period participated in this program. The officials did not identify themselves to the relatives as being connected with the Polish Military but only as officials of the Polish Embassy. Many of these letters were delivered in various cities in the Eastern part of the country, from Washington, D. C. to Massachusetts. I don't recall any of the names of the recipients of the letters, but during the duration of this project, no one from the MA's office here was successful in recruiting anyone. Frankly, I thought the idea was a crazy one. Because of the apparent lack of success, the project was abandoned early in 1957.

Actually, there were two theories in Z-II on how to run operations in the United States. I maintained that Z-II should confine its recruiting activities to native-born Americans who do not have a Polish background. I felt that even though these people may be harder to recruit than Polish-speaking Americans, they are less likely to fall under the suspicion of the FBI. Most of the Z-II staff, on the other hand, wanted to concentrate on the Polish-American colonies here. They argued only that emigre groups are more likely to be receptive to recruitment because of their hereditary

ties with Poland. In my opinion, their theory was based less on reason than on an incomplete understanding of the situation in the United States.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel Monat, from your experience what courses of action does Z-II take to neutralize agents they suspect to have been doubled?

Mr. Monat. In cases in which a controlled Z-II agent is suspected of operating against Z-II on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, Z-II has four alternatives open to it. They can "freeze" the agent in place, explaining to him that he is to remain frozen until recontacted. The purpose of this action is to confuse the hostile intelligence service since Z-II would eventually sever all contact with the agent without informing him to this effect. Or Z-II could maintain contact with him in order to feed misleading information through him to the intelligence agency of the foreign power. A third method used by Z-II is to lure the agent into Communist controlled territory in order to seize him for a detailed interrogation and eventual imprisonment. Finally, in cases wherein the security of Z-II's operations have been considerably jeopardized, Z-II will coordinate with the UB to arrange for the assassination of the agent.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you believe that Z-II's operations are affected to any great extent by the alternating political atmosphere between East and West? By that I mean do you believe that changes in the Soviet tactical propaganda line have any influence on the degree to which Z-II directs its operations against the United States?

Mr. Monat. No, there is no connection other than to increase the delicacy of an operation. Polish intelligence continues to operate against the West regardless of the current Soviet diplomatic approach. In early 1959, I remember I attended a talk given to Z-II by General BORDZILOWSKI. He was angry with Z-II and said we were not fully carrying out our mission. BORDZILOWSKI said that Z-II would have to become more aggressive in every way. For one thing, he ordered Z-II to start using friendly Polish-Americans as a means of access to native Americans for recruitment purposes. He also added that Z-II should see to it that an aggressive arm take care of kidnapping or liquidation of former Z-II officers who had emigrated or fled abroad and are now working with the West against the East.

Mr. Sourwine. What is the attitude of the Polish intelligence services toward the use of Communist Party members in the United States?

Mr. Monat. The MA's office does not have any official contact with the Communist Party of the United States. Furthermore, there are no special orders issued to Z-II representatives here to use Party members as agents. There are two reasons for this policy: first, to avoid compromising the Communist Party; second, Z-II feels that more than half of the CP-USA members are working with the FBI. Although I do not know definitely the policy of the UB in this regard,

there is a general inclination in Polish intelligence to not use CP members as agents. One reason for this feeling is based on a belief that CP members are used by the Soviets. Therefore, there might be a danger of comprising a Russian operation if the Poles tried to develop CP members for their own purposes. However, in a particular instance, if Polish intelligence knew of a CP member who would make a good agent, worth the risk involved, efforts would probably be made to recruit him -- but only after the Warsaw authorities had cleared their intention with the appropriate authorities in Moscow. This would not be done though just in order to use a person at the level of a mere informant.

Mr. Sourwine. Are there any other cover positions besides the Military Attache's office to which Z-II can assign its staff officers in the United States?

Mr. Montz: Yes, in 1958 Z-II also had two slots available to them as staff members of the Polish Delegation to the United Nations. These positions were being held by Z-II staff officers with the ranks of captain and major. In 1959 Z-II decided to give up one of its UN slots in return for one in the Polish Embassy in Washington.

Mr. Sourwine. Are there any other Polish delegations to international organizations which are used as cover for Polish intelligence?

Mr. Montz. Yes, sir. I believe I mentioned Unit 2000 as

one of the organic components of Z-II. This is the administrative body to which are assigned all Poles on the International Control Commission in Vietnam and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. From its origin in 1953 until April 1959, Military Unit 2000 was under the administrative and operational control of Z-I, the First or Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff. In about December 1958, Z-II decided it would be to their advantage to assume the administrative and operational control of the Unit. In about January 1959, General KORCZYNSKI, as chief of Z-II, wrote a letter to General Bordzilowski, the Chief of Staff, recommending such a transfer of authority. In his letter, KORCZYNSKI justified this transfer by stating that members of this unit in Vietnam and Korea have intimate contact with other foreign representatives to these countries. The real reasons KORCZYNSKI desired the change -- although he did not mention it in the letter -- was that in 1958, Z-II had begun to use Unit 2000 for three purposes: first, to secure background information about the non-Polish representatives on the commissions; second, to provide experience to young inexperienced intelligence officers through contact with foreign nationals; and, finally, to spot potential staff officers for Z-II from among the non Z-II Poles on the delegations. BORDZILOWSKI concurred in Z-II's request, and the administrative and operational control of Unit 2000 passed

to Z-II in April 1959. The Unit is still dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for policy guidance, just as it has always been since its inception. At the time of the transfer of authority, Unit 2000 abroad consisted of approximately 120 people. Of these about 40 were regular, uniformed Polish Army officers, one was a member of Z-II, and the remainder were from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UB and the Army's counterintelligence service.

Mr. Sourwine. Aside from the positions you have already mentioned, what other official Polish positions abroad are available to Z-II for cover purposes?

Mr. Monat. Z-II also uses the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade for cover purposes. Until November 1958 only a verbal agreement existed between Z-II and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding cover for Z-II staff officers in diplomatic offices abroad. In November 1958, a conference was held in the Polish Foreign Ministry and was attended by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, the chief of Z-II, General KORCZYNSKI and another Z-II staff officer. The conference resulted in a written agreement which allotted to Z-II a certain number of cover positions in diplomatic installations in various Western countries.

Although no such written agreement exists between Z-II and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, there is a verbal agreement which allows Z-II to send its staff officers abroad in the

guise of legitimate representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

In September 1958 about twenty Z-II staff officers were placed in various positions in the two ministries and stationed in Poland. These officers are being trained in these ministries for eventual cover positions abroad. These officers are retained by the ministries until such times as Z-II assigns them to positions abroad as legal representatives of the ministries. These Z-II officers will utilize their employment with the ministries as cover for Z-II and cannot be arbitrarily assigned by the ministries without prior approval of Z-II. In order to preclude compromise or mis-assignment, the identities of these Z-II personnel are limited to a very few officials in the ministries and Z-II Headquarters. Other than approving the assignment of these personnel abroad, Z-II is not responsible for any of the administrative processing, such as passport applications, and so forth. This responsibility lies with the appropriate ministry. These personnel are used in a civilian cover and are not affiliated with the military, as are the Military Attache personnel.

Mr. Sourwine. In describing the organization of Z-II, I believe you mentioned a Radio Battalion. What are the functions of this unit?

Mr. Monst. The Radio Battalion has its headquarters in Walcz, which is about one hundred miles east of Szczecin,

Poland. I believe the equipment used by the Battalion is capable of covering any part of the world in which Polish intelligence has an interest. The Battalion is responsible for the constant monitoring of military broadcasts of Western armies in Europe and for the operation of radio direction finders to locate communication facilities of Western armies in Europe. In the event of a war involving Poland, the Radio Battalion will be used to maintain communications between Z-II Headquarters and Z-II agents operating in Western countries. This unit is the best equipped and most effective Polish communications unit in Poland.

Mr. Sourwine. How does the Radio Battalion procure its equipment?

Mr. Monat. Most of the equipment is obtained from the Soviet Union and is of extremely high quality. Some parts such as electronic tubes are purchased in Western countries by Z-II representatives stationed abroad. I have already mentioned the way in which MA personnel in the U. S. are able to purchase electronic equipment. Most of this is destined for the Radio Battalion.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel Monat, you have been discussing the way in which the Operational Branch collects its information against the Western defense establishments. Would you tell us please what is done with this information when it reaches Warsaw? I presume this is where the Reports Branch

you mentioned comes in.

Mr. Monat. This is correct. The Reports Branch evaluates all the information received from the Operational Branch's covert and overt sources. Among these would be agent reports; newspapers, books and periodicals; and the information gained through the monitoring of foreign commercial and military radio broadcasts. The Reports Branch also is responsible for the editing of military field manuals pertaining to the table of organization, order of battle, and tactics of Western armies. It also prepares and disseminates training material about Western armies, and annual and special intelligence requirements for the guidance of the collectors. The Reports Branch also edits and disseminates intelligence publications for use by the Polish General Staff. Finally, it prepares military intelligence studies on all Western countries and special studies for use by other Polish governmental agencies.

Mr. Sourwine. Specifically, what other Polish governmental agencies would receive these special studies?

Mr. Monat. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs or UB, as it is known, and the PZPR, the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, this brings up an interesting point; what influence, if any, does the PZPR have on the overall operations of Z-II?

Mr. Monat. Although Z-II is responsible to the chief

General Staff for its activities, the PZPR has always exerted considerable influence on the overall operations of the Z-II organization. The two Polish chiefs of Z-II since 1946, Generals Wacław KOMAR and Grzegorz KORCZYŃSKI, were appointed on the basis of their high political standing. It was not unusual for the chief of Z-II to receive instructions from the PZPR Central Committee to either lessen or intensify operations against a particular country. Instructions from the PZPR Central Committee did not necessarily come through channels, that is, from the Ministry of Defense. Rather they were given directly to the chief of Z-II from the Central Committee in the form of high level political advice. The PZPR is also instrumental in influencing the Chief of Z-II in the assignment of individuals as military attaches abroad.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, while you were stationed in Washington, to what extent did you coordinate your activities with the Soviet and other Satellite military attaches stationed here?

Mr. Monat. Well, generally a Polish MA maintains no more than a social contact with the Soviet MA, and this was true in my case. The Polish MA is not required to coordinate any intelligence activities with the Soviet MA. There is no official exchange of information between the two. It is possible, however, that a Soviet MA might unofficially request the Polish MA to furnish information concerning the results of

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a field trip which the Polish MA might have made. This is strictly an unofficial request and the cooperation of the Polish MA depends entirely on his personal relationship with his Soviet counterpart. Cases of cooperation are very rare due to possible embarrassment to the Polish MA. For example, if a Polish MA furnished certain information to a Soviet MA, this information would be quickly transmitted to Moscow by the Soviet MA and also to Warsaw by the Polish MA. The information from the Polish MA would eventually also be transmitted by Z-II Headquarters to Moscow. Upon receipt of this information, Moscow would say the information is old and already in their hands. Such a reaction would be embarrassing and disconcerting to the Polish Military Attache involved. Thus few Polish Military attaches cooperate with such requests since a fulfillment might reflect right back on them unfavorably.

Mr. Sourwine. What is generally the relationship between Satellite MA's stationed in the West?

Mr. Monat. Primarily this is only a social relationship; some intelligence information is exchanged and, if necessary, assistance given by the Bloc MA's to help in the accomplishment of their respective missions.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you said you were at one time the chief of the Military Foreign Affairs Sub-Branch. Would you tell us please the mission of this organization?

Mr. Monat. I was the head of this branch for a brief period in 1952 while it was still an organic part of Z-II. In 1953 it was removed from the Z-II organization and placed directly under the General Staff of the Polish Army. Its basic mission, however, has always remained the same. The Military Foreign Affairs Branch is responsible for the official contact and necessary liaison between the Polish Army General Staff and the foreign military and attache personnel assigned to Poland. In addition to its protocol type activities, the branch is also responsible for maintaining current information on the foreign military personnel and their families assigned to Poland. These files include all available personal data and reports of attache activities as furnished by the UB. About two and a half years ago there was a strong possibility that the Military Foreign Affairs Sub-Branch and the Military Attache Branch would be consolidated under Z-II. There is a good chance this consolidation may have occurred since I left Poland. This would be a great advantage for the Z-II since it would thereby gain complete jurisdiction over the Military Foreign Affairs Sub-Branch.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, in addition to the material that you have covered so far, there are some matters that Mr. Mandel, our Director of Research, wishes to inquire about. And with the permission of the Chairman, Mr. Mandel may go ahead.

Mr. Mandel. Colonel, will you tell us a little bit about the relationship between the Polish Embassy and the Polish Communist paper in this country as you know about it?

Mr. Monat. Yes. I know about the relation between the Polish Embassy and the Glos Ludowy. This newspaper is financed and supported by the Polish Embassy on a monthly basis.

Mr. Mandel. Do they contribute directly to the paper from the Embassy or is it done in some indirect manner?

Mr. Monat. This is done in a covered way to the newspaper.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how these payments are made -- are they made in cash?

Mr. Monat. Yes; those payments are made--

Mr. Sourwine. In United States currency?

Mr. Monat. Yes; in United States currency.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where this currency comes from?

Mr. Monat. It comes from Poland.

Mr. Sourwine. It is actually shipped to the United States?

Mr. Monat. No. They do not ship it. It is included in the sum sent by the Polish National Bank to an American bank for the use of the Embassy in its work.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether it is transmitted by Embassy personnel or through other channels?

Mr. Monat. That depends, but mostly it is transmitted through the Embassy personnel in Washington.

Mr. Sourwine. Is this a fixed amount each month or do they seek only to meet a deficit?

Mr. Monat. No, it is not a fixed amount. It varies between approximately two and four thousand a month.

Mr. Sourwine. Monthly?

Mr. Monat. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Nat Einhorn?

Mr. Monat. Yes. I know Nat Einhorn. I met him for the first time in 1955 in the Polish Embassy, Washington.

Mr. Sourwine. Does he hold a position with the Polish Embassy?

Mr. Monat. Yes; he is working in the Polish Embassy in the Consular Section.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, for a period of about two years, in 1950 and 1951, you were head of the Reports Section of O-II, is that right?

Mr. Monat. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. The American Section?

Mr. Monat. Yes; American Reports Section in the Polish

Military Intelligence.

Mr. Sourwine. During that time what can you tell us about the types of material which came in in the reports that crossed your desk?

Mr. Monat. Most of the material which crossed my desk came from various sources from the United States, Canada, and from West Germany. And they all were concerned with the American Army, the Navy and Air Force and the military economy of the United States. They dealt primarily with the organization and order of battle of American units around the world, with technical data concerning new armaments introduced in the U.S. armed forces, and with American military personnel - especially in high positions.

Mr. Sourwine. Was your intelligence good with regard to the top level in our military organization?

Mr. Monat. Yes, I think, yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Did this intelligence include predictions with respect to coming changes in our top military organization or was it concerned entirely with changes which had taken place?

Mr. Monat. It was concerned with changes which had taken place and with predictions of the future.

Mr. Sourwine. Were the predictions good, so far as you remember, that is, did the predictions turn out to be accurate?

Mr. Monat. Not always.

Mr. Sourwine. What was the general level of accuracy of those predictions, good, indifferent or bad?

Mr. Monat. I think the general level was quite good.

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, the Polish intelligence about this country is good enough to be able to predict with a relatively high degree of accuracy the changes which are about to be made in our top level military organization?

Mr. Monat. That is very difficult to answer, because there were some predictions that were correct -- there were others that were completely false -- but if I may state generally, there were many correct predictions.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember any specific predictions that were made which turned out to be accurate?

Mr. Monat. I remember several, not concerned with personnel, but rather with changes in organization, order of battle of the American troops, and technical data; those were fairly correct.

Mr. Sourwine. You say you remember them -- you remember that there were such instances, or do you mean that you remember the specific details?

Mr. Monat. Oh, no, I remember there were such instances. I do not remember the specific details.

Mr. Sourwine. With regard to new armaments do you remember any particular instances of reports concerning new armaments?

Mr. Monat. Yes. I remember talks and reports about new American planes, the F-86, F-84, F-100, and the B-36 and B-47. I remember, also, early reports about the possibility of using atomic warheads with the field forces.

Mr. Sourwine. The practical use of atomic weapons?

Mr. Monat. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. How early did you get these reports?

Mr. Monat. It was about 1951. There was speculation about the possibilities of using them.

There were, also, reports about new American aircraft carriers and new American airplanes.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall about when you had your first reports respecting the tactical use of atomic weapons in the American forces as more than speculation?

Mr. Monat. I read the first speculations in various reports in 1951 and 1952. Then when I returned from my assignment to China in 1955, there was a general conviction that the American Army had tactical atomic weapons. Also, in 1950 and 1951 and 1952 the Polish intelligence got some reports about the American missiles sent over to Germany from the United States. We learned all of the details -- all the technical details about the new missiles. As far as I remember the missiles were the Honest John and, probably, the BOMARC.

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell us, please, what you know in detail about the special parachute sabotage battalion of O-II?

Mr. Monat. It is the only separate battalion of this kind in the Polish Army. It is comprised of about 500 men stationed in Wroclaw. The mission of that battalion is to prepare sabotage and paratroop groups which will be used during wartime in Western Europe, especially in Germany.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you have given a good deal of information about the role of Red China and the Soviet Union in the Korean War. This is a subject upon which you have written an article which will appear in an upcoming issue of Life Magazine, is that correct?

Mr. Monat. Yes. That is correct.

Mr. Sourwine. Is all of the material in your Life Magazine story entirely factual?

Mr. Monat. Yes. This material is entirely factual, based on my own personal experience in North Korea and China between 1952 and 1955.

Mr. Sourwine. With the permission of the Chairman we will endeavor to get a copy of this material and offer it as an annex to this record.

For the present time, Colonel, would you just outline what you have said with regard to those matters?

Mr. Monat. My article, "Korea From the Other Side", in the June 27th issue of LIFE Magazine deals with my personal experience in Korea, where I served as the Polish Military Attache between 1952 and 1955. I show there the important role played by the Soviets in preparing and conducting the war, and describe my contacts with the Russian officers and men who took active part in the conflict. Another topic covered is the Chinese take-over from the Koreans of the real burden of pursuing the war.

I also stress the relations between the Chinese and Russians, Russians and Koreans, and Koreans and Chinese. The desire of the Korean people to stop the war against the will of their rulers is also described.

A part of the article pertains to the diplomatic colony in Pyongyang and to the attempts by Polish intelligence to gain as much information as possible about the Western forces - especially American - taking part in the fighting. The final portion of the article is devoted to the work of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission, and especially to the method by which the Polish and Czech members of the Commission helped the Sino-Korean side to conceal violations of the armistice agreement.

Senator Eastland. Is that all?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, for the time being.

Senator Eastland. The hearing will be adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

And we thank you, Mr. Monat, for your appearance here today.

(Whereupon, at 2:45 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee

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